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This paper investigates the effects of implementing a dual income tax (DIT) in Ger-
many. We follow the reform proposal of the German Council of Economic Advisors 
(2003) and analyze its implications on capital formation, investment and welfare using a 
dynamic computable general equilibrium model. The main features of the model are an 
intertemporal investment model and the traditional Ramsey model on the household 
side. Our findings suggest that the introduction of a DIT with a proportional capital in-
come tax rate of 30% and progressive labour income tax rates up to 35% leads to higher 
investments, an increased capital accumulation up to 5.8% and welfare gains of about 
1% of GDP. 
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  1 Introduction
A redesign of the German tax system is imperatively required since the present tax law
is complicated, non-transparent and a major obstacle for the country to survive in the
international tax competition. Double taxation and legal tax loopholes create severe
distortions concerning the investment and ﬁnancial decisions of ﬁrms resulting in major
welfare losses. In the light of recent discussions, especially brought about by the report
of the German Council of Economic Advisors (GCEA,2003), a dual income tax
(DIT) has become increasingly popular as an option for reforming the German tax system.
A DIT, which has been applied in several Nordic countries and practiced in Austria and
Belgium in some rudimentary form, would not only reduce these distortions but also
create substantial eﬃciency gains.
We use a computable general equilibrium growth model calibrated to the German
economy and consisting of four blocks. Optimal investment behavior is derived from
a neoclassical, intertemporal investment model with convex adjustment costs. Since we
mainly focus on the eﬃciency eﬀects of the tax reform on welfare, we model the household
sector using the traditional Ramsey model of an inﬁnitely lived household. The public
sector introduces various distortions on agents’ behavior through taxation. The model’s
fourth building block is the Rest of the World (RoW), which closes the model. While the
home economy is considered in detail, the foreign economy is only roughly modelled.
Following the proposal made by the GCEA (2003), we measure the economic eﬀects
such a reform would have. Our ﬁndings suggest that the introduction of the proposed
dual income tax with a proportional capital income tax rate of 30 per cent and progressive
1labour income tax rates up to 35 per cent leads to higher investments and an increased
capital accumulation. The calculated 5.8 per cent increase in the capital stock is mainly
driven by a nine per cent reduction in the cost of capital as a result of the major reduction
in statutory tax rates on the corporate and household level. Moreover, GDP and welfare
in terms of life-time income also rise by 3.3 and 1.6 per cent respectively.
The next section of the paper describes the experiences of Nordic countries with the
dual income tax and presents the advantages and shortcomings of such a tax. Section
three introduces the baseline model and derives several important behavioral responses as
well as comparative static results. Section four discusses the simulation results, which are
checked with regard to their robustness by a sensitivity analysis. Finally, the conclusion
highlights the most important ﬁndings.
2 The DIT - An Option for Germany
Germany, the country of the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ and once the leader of European growth
statistics, has now fallen behind most other European countries in terms of growth. Ger-
many faces persistent structural problems and a weak economic climate which is among
other factors also the result of the increased tax competition. Moreover, according to
the GCEA (2003), the tangled mass of partly proposed, partly enforced tax reliefs and
modiﬁcations in the tax system have not led to much improvement but induced a cred-
ibility loss, resulting in decreasing investments. Furthermore, the partial alteration of
the tax system, has undermined the principles underlying the comprehensive income tax
system and led to many distortions concerning investment behavior, ﬁnancial decisions
2or the organizational choice of a ﬁrm. While the German income tax system is still per-
ceived to be a comprehensive one, it systematically deviates from this principle in reality;
e.g. distributed proﬁts are taxed diﬀerently than earnings stemming from other sources
according to the half-income principle of dividend taxation. Additional anomalies arise
due to the multitude of tax exemptions, including for instance returns from institutional
savings or capital gains. Another incompatibility consists in the methodical diﬀerence of
determining the respective tax base of labor and capital income.1
2.1 Reasons for a Schedular Tax System
There are several reasons for applying diﬀerent tax rates for labour and capital. Thus,
a lower capital income tax rate as given by the DIT could substantially reduce the in-
tertemporal distortions related to the saving-consumption decision. These distortions are
the result of a double taxation phenomenon: Savings stem from after tax earned income
and returns from saving are taxed once again when they occur. To avoid this additional
burden on future consumption, no capital income tax should exist. However, this is not
always feasible and thus a lower capital income tax rate compared to the labour income
tax rate is desirable (Boadway, 2004).
Moreover, the present tax competition presents an additional argument for taxing
the internationally mobile factor capital at a lower rate. Despite the recent tax reliefs,
1While the capital income tax base is determined on the accrual basis (diﬀerence in wealth
between the beginning and end of each tax period), the labor tax base is calculated on a cash
basis (diﬀerence between revenue arising from labour supply and the expenses needed to achieve
this revenue). Thus, income stemming from labour enjoys tax privileges, since expenses linked
to human capital investments are immediately deductible, while those required for capital in-
vestments can only be deducted later on via depreciation (Wagner, 2000).
3Germany’s eﬀective tax rates are still among the highest within Europe (European
Commission 2001). Albeit the statutory corporate tax rate amounts to only 25 per cent,
adding the local trade tax and the solidarity surcharge the eﬀective tax rate on proﬁts
adds up to 38.7 per cent, while the EU 15 average is 29.4 per cent, the OECD average
is just 29 per cent and the average among the ten new EU members only 16.p per cent.
Therefore, Germany will have to lower its capital income tax rates further to prevent
capital from ﬂeeing to low tax countries.
Last but not least, the production eﬃciency theorem2 states that a wage tax solely
distorts the consumption decision, while a source tax on capital also distorts the interna-
tional capital allocation resulting in a deadweight loss.
Therefore, these arguments favour levying a lower tax rate on capital vis-a-vis labour.
The empirical ﬁndings of instance by Mendoza et al. (1994), Devereux et al.
(2002) or Sørensen (2000) also suggest a shift of the tax burden towards labour in-
come.3 Thus, both, theory and empirical evidence provide multiple arguments in favour
of introducing a DIT.
2See Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
3Mendoza et al. construct time series of tax rates for seven OECD countries from 1965-
1988 using national accounts and revenue statistics. Their ﬁndings suggest inter alia that there is
a moderate shift of the tax burden towards labour. Devereux et al. (2002) provide evidence
for the international trend towards lower tax rates on capital. Similar conclusions are derived by
Sørensen (2000) who computes average eﬀective tax rates on labour and capital respectively
for 12 countries for the periods 1981-1985 and 1991-1995. His results show that while the tax
burden on labour increased, the burden on capital declined or remained constant.
42.2 The Experience of Nordic Countries
Looking for an adequate option for reforming the German tax system one may notice that
similar problems were solved in the Nordic Countries by introducing a DIT a decade ago.
Several papers like Sørensen (2001), Cnossen (2000), and Sørensen/Nielsen (1997)
discuss the experiences these countries had with such a tax system. Starting with Denmark
in 1987, followed by Sweden in 1991, and Norway and Finland in the subsequent years, all
four countries changed their tax system from a comprehensive income tax to a schedular
one. The modiﬁcations included a reduction in statutory capital income tax rates to 28
per cent in Norway (IBFD 2004) and Finland and 30 per cent in Denmark (European
Tax Handbook 2004). Simultaneously, the existing tax base was broadened such that
major losses in aggregate tax revenue were prevented. Additionally, a progressive tax
s c h e d u l e ,r a n g i n gb e t w e e n2 8t o4 1 . 5p e rc e n ti nN o r w a y ,o r3 9 . 7t o5 9p e rc e n ti nD e n m a r k
w a sl e v i e do nl a b o u ri n c o m e( Mennel/Förster 2003). Regarding the double taxation
of distributed proﬁts, Norway and Finland avoided this by applying full imputation.
The double taxation of retained proﬁts was abolished only in Norway. Furthermore,
withholding or source taxes were installed at the company level or at the level of interest,
royalty or other types of capital income paying entities, to guarantee the single taxation
of capital income.
2.3 The Concept of a Dual Income Tax
The dual income tax can be ascribed to the theoretical model of the Johansson-Samuelson
tax, which taxes only the true economic proﬁt. Such a tax is levied uniformly on all types
5of income that have been determined in an identical way in the country of residence. Since
income cannot always be computed in the same way, diﬀerent tax rates may be necessary
to adjust the diﬀerences in the computation of the tax base. Accordingly, a pure DIT
distinguishes between capital and labour income. Capital income — including business
proﬁts, dividends, capital gains, interest and rental income — is taxed at a low proportional
tax rate, whereas progressive tax rates are levied on labour income (Cnossen 2000,
Sørensen 1994). Moreover, a full imputation system should be installed to prevent the
double taxation of distributed proﬁts. The separation between capital and labour income
taxation has several advantages. On the one hand, the proportional tax on capital income
mostly assures the aspired neutrality concerning the investment and ﬁnancial decisions,
as well as the choice of the legal form of the ﬁrm.
On the other hand, the uncoupled proportional taxation of capital income allows for
suﬃcient ﬂexibility to react and survive under conditions of tax competition without
changing the whole tax system. Furthermore, the progressive taxation of labour income
including wages (as well as the employer’s calculatory salary), pension income, governmen-
tal transfers, and social security beneﬁts, oﬀers a solid base for redistribution, if desired.4
However, one has to consider that the diﬀerence between the low, proportional tax rate on
capital income and the higher top marginal tax rate on labour income is not too large in
order to prevent tax arbitrage. Without any functional mechanism to counteract income
shifting, especially managers of non-corporate ﬁrms are tempted to declare their fruits
of labour as capital income to avoid the higher progressive tax that is levied on labour
4See Sørensen (1994) and Cnossen (2000) for a detailed description of the features of a
DIT.
6income. Additionally, by lending to the ﬁr m ,i tw o u l db ep o s s i b l et oa c c u m u l a t et h e
returns to debt-ﬁnanced assets within a corporation subject to the lower capital income
tax and, on the other hand, deduct the interest payment against the higher personal tax
rate.
An often cited criticism regarding the dual income tax, according to Wagner (2000),
relates to the fact that it is a schedular tax. Nevertheless, such an allegation would only be
meaningful if all types of income, irrespective of their source, were determined in the same
way but taxed at diﬀerent tax rates. In Germany, however, capital and labour income
are computed in diﬀerent ways under the present tax law. Another concern related to
the DIT applies to small enterprises, such as partnerships and proprietorships. They may
suﬀer a severe disadvantage if returns on business investments are taxed at the higher
tax rate applying to labour income. This is what Sørensen (1994) calls the Achilles’
heel of the DIT. To avoid this discrimination of small enterprises, one may impute a
rate of return on equity and tax this calculated return as capital income at the lower
capital income tax rate. Norway for instance solved this problem using a special method:
Returns from capital are computed using a statutory interest factor, which is equal to the
return on three-month Treasury Bills. Labour income is then determined residually as the
diﬀerence between the owner’s share of corporate proﬁts and capital income (Cnossen
2000). Finnish tax law requires dividends paid by unlisted companies to be divided into
two components. One is treated as capital income and subjected to the capital income tax
rate and the other one is treated as earned income taxed at the progressive labour income
tax (Sørensen 2001, 1994). An additional shortcoming of such a tax system seems to
be the fact that non-residents do not have to pay any taxes on withholding interest and
7royalties and thus several tax loopholes are created, but this mainly worries the foreign
tax authorities.
3 The Model
Evaluating and quantifying the eﬀects of a comprehensive tax reform is a diﬃcult task.
B e s i d et h em o r eo b v i o u sﬁrst order eﬀects economy-wide repercussions and second-order
eﬀects have to be considered, too. Hence, it is advisable to use a general equilibrium
m o d e lt oc a p t u r ea l lk i n d so fe ﬀects. The model is in line with neoclassical growth theory.
Savings and investment decisions are forward looking and thus permit a consideration of
important tax capitalization eﬀects. Furthermore, the model mimics several important
behavioral margins at the ﬁrm level that are strongly sensitive to the eﬀects of capital
income taxation like the investment behavior and the ﬁnancial decision.
The applied computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, IFOmod, is a modiﬁcation
of the Swiss CGE model developed by Keuschnigg (2002). Compared to other well
known CGE models - like Multimode Mark III developed by the IMF (Laxton et al.
1998), OECDTAX, developed by Sørensen (2001), or the model developed by Fehr
(1999) - our model contains a detailed modelling of the ﬁrm sector as well as the traditional
Ramsey model instead of an overlapping generation model on the household side, which
allows us to estimate how the reform aﬀects the welfare of the representative individual.
83.1 Business Sector
This section presents an inter-temporal investment model with convex adjustment costs
to highlight the main transmission channels: We rely on a linear homogenous production
technology with capital and labour as production factors. The price of the output good
is normalized to unity. Additionally, the ﬁrm incurs adjustment costs which result from
disruptions due to the ﬁrm’s internal reorganization. The adjustment cost function is
assumed to be linearly homogeneous in investment and capital and convex in investment.
The steady state adjustment costs are zero such that they do not inﬂuence the steady
state solution.
Domestic ﬁrms hire labour and accumulate capital and debt to maximize their ﬁrm
value. However, optimal investment and ﬁnancial decisions are distorted through taxa-
tion. We consider a proﬁt tax which is levied on ﬁr ml e v e la sw e l la sad i v i d e n da n da
capital gains tax on household level. Moreover, interest income is also subject to taxation.
According to the present German tax system, distributed earnings are ﬁrst taxed on the
ﬁrm level and then half of these are once again taxed on the personal level. Although there
is eﬀectively no capital gains tax in Germany, the variable is carried along for reasons of
completeness. In addition, a tax on labour income as well as a value added tax (VAT)
are considered.
93.1.1 Financial Identities and Arbitrage
Capital expands over time whenever gross investment, It, exceeds the depreciation of the
existing capital stock, δKt. Therefore capital accumulation is given by
GKt+1 = It +( 1− δ)Kt (1)
where G is a growth factor determined by productivity growth5. Concerning debt
policy, we assume that interest payments on debt include an additional premium m(b)
which denotes the agency cost of debt depending on the debt asset ratio bt = Bt/Kt of
a ﬁrm. The agency costs are increasing in bt,6 reﬂecting that a ﬁrm’s risk of bankruptcy
increases with rising indebtedness as the real cost of default increase. Debt accumulates
5IFOmod includes a ﬁxed exogenous trend growth, Xt, of labour productivity. Accordingly,
the linearly homogeneous production technology is deﬁned as:
˜ Yt = F( ˜ Kt,X tLt). (2)
Since Lt is assumed to remain constant in the long run, manpower becomes increasingly
productive with labour saving technological progress. Therefore, labour input XtLt will grow
with the productivity growth rate g,
Xt+1 = G · Xt; G =1+g. (3)
We analyze a long-run growth equilibrium where the capital output ratio remains constant.
This requires capital and output to grow at the same rate g. Variables such as capital, con-
sumption, etc. can be divided into a trend and a stationary component:
˜ Kt = Xt · Kt ⇒ Kt = ˜ Kt/Xt. (4)
In the stationary case, these variables have to be detrended.
Dividing the equation of capital accumulation, ˜ Kt+1 = ˜ It +( 1− δ) ˜ Kt,b yXt and noting











⇒ GKt+1 = It +( 1− δ)Kt. (5)
6Thus, for the convex adjustment costs both the ﬁrst, m’(b), and the second , m”(b), deriva-
tive are positive.
10according to:
GBt+1 = Bt + BNt. (6)
Thus, the next period’s stock of debt, Bt+1, is the sum of the existing stock of debt, Bt,
and new debt, BNt.
Net of tax proﬁts consist of output less adjustment costs, Jt, wage payments, wtLt,
depreciation, δKt, interest payments plus agency cost on debt, (it + m)Bt,a n dt h et a x
liability, Tt, according to:
πt = Yt − Jt − wtLt − δKt − (it + m)Bt − Tt,
with Tt = tU[Yt − Jt − wtLt − δKt − (it + m)Bt − e(It − δKt)] ,
(7)
where e represents the tax allowances for investments.7
We consider a small open economy and thus the world interest rate, it,i sﬁxed. Net of
tax interest rates, rt =( 1−ti)it , equate across countries since we assume capital mobility
and apply the source principle of taxation.8
Following a basic no-arbitrage condition:
rtVt =( 1− t
D)Dt +( 1− t
G)[GVt+1 − Vt − VN t] ,( 8 )
in equilibrium an investor needs to be indiﬀerent between a ﬁnancial market investment,
yielding a net of tax return of rtVt where Vt denotes the value of ﬁrm equity, and a
real investment, yielding net of tax dividends (1 − tD)Dt and net of tax capital gains
(1 − tG)[GVt+1 − Vt − VN t].
7If e=0 we have the case of true economic depreciation. If e=1 we allow for a full immediate
write-oﬀ and and tU can be interpreted as a cash-ﬂow tax.
8According to the source principle a change in the domestic interest tax rate aﬀects also
foreign savings.
11A c c o r d i n gt ot h ec a s hﬂow identity:
INt =( πt − Dt)+VN t + BNt ,( 9 )
net investments9 , INt = It − δKt, can either be ﬁnanced via a reduction in payouts
(dividends) and therefore through retained earnings (πt − Dt), by issuing new equity,
VN t, or externally via new debt, BNt.
Since we refer to a mature economy, characterized by mature ﬁrms10, we follow the
“New View” of dividend taxation, and thus dividends are determined residually (Sinn,
1987). Keeping in mind the empirical evidence provided by Auerbach and Hasset
(2003), who state that both views on the eﬀects of dividend taxation are valid, we deter-
mine new share issues exogenously by VN t = β(1 − etu)INt. This approach is similar to
Fehr (1999). New investments are largely ﬁnanced by retained earnings or by new debt
and only a ﬁxed fraction, β,o fﬁve per cent is ﬁnanced via new share issues.
Solving the cash ﬂow identity (9) for dividends and inserting the expression for net of
tax proﬁts, (7), we can derive an explicit formula determining dividends:
Dt =[ Yt − Jt − wLt − δKt − (it + mt)Bt] − Tt + VN t + BNt − INt. (10)
9We assume that replacement investments are always ﬁnanced internally.
10 According to the nucleus theory the nucleus is incorporated in the ﬁrst step and then a phase of
internal growth sets in. During this phase, no dividends are paid, nor are any new shares issued, but
all proﬁts are retained to ﬁnance all proﬁtable investments. After the nucleus has reached its stage of
maturity, all proﬁts are distributed as dividends. The dividend tax discriminates against the initial size
of the nucleus; thus in the set-up phase, the ‘Old View’ applies, but the dividend tax is neutral in the
stage of maturity according to the ‘New View’ (Sinn 1991).
123.1.2 Intertemporal Optimization
Firms want to maximize their value by choosing optimal investment and ﬁnancial poli-
cies. To derive an expression determining the ﬁrm value, we rearrange the no-arbitrage



























t denotes the end of period ﬁrm value according to V e
t =( 1+ rt
1−tG)Vt.T h el a s t
condition excludes bubbles and restricts the solution to the fundamental value of the ﬁrm.
T h u s ,t h ee n do fp e r i o dm a r k e tv a l u eo faﬁrm is determined by the present value of all
future net of tax dividend payments less new equity injections. The net dividend ﬂow is




1−tG . Using the two tax factors γD ≡
(1−tD)(1−tU)






and substituting the dividends from (10) into (11) the maximization problem becomes:
V
e(Kt,B t)= m a x








s.t. (1) and (6) (12)
with
χt = γ
D [Yt − Jt − wtLt − δKt − (it + m)Bt]+
1 − tD
1 − tGBNt − γ
IINt.
Thus, the value function V (Kt,B t) is a function of the historically accumulated stocks
capital and debt. We use the Bellman’s Principle of Optimality to derive optimal labor
demand, optimal investment and optimal ﬁnancial behavior.
Deﬁning the shadow prices of capital: qt ≡
∂V(Kt)
∂Kt and debt: λt ≡−
∂V(Bt)
∂Bt , respec-
tively,11 the optimality conditions concerning the control variables labour, investment and
11The shadow prices determine the increase in the value of the objective function resulting
from a marginal increase in the stock variables capital or debt.
13new debt are:
(a) L : wt = F0
L,t ,
























optimal investment decision incorporates the advantage of decreasing marginal adjustment
cost and the marginal advantage of accelerated depreciation, if e>0. In the case that
depreciation conforms to true economic depreciation, e =0holds and thus the share of
marginal investment ﬁnanced by new share issues (here, fraction β) incur a cost of one.
The fraction (1 − β), ﬁnanced through other sources, will then primarily be subject to
the capital gains tax.
T h ee n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o n sc o n c e r n i n gt h es t o c kv a r i a b l e sa r e :














T h e s ee q u a t i o n se n a b l eu st od e t e r m i n et h ec o s to fc a p i t a lw h i c hi n ﬂuences the invest-
ment decision of the ﬁrm as well as the cost of equity and debt ﬁnance which determine
a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing behavior.
3.1.3 Financing Behavior
The optimal level of indebtedness of a ﬁrm is reached if the cost of equity ﬁnance equals
the cost of debt ﬁnance. Substituting (13c) into the envelope condition for the co-state
14variable debt (14b) the expression determining the optimal debt asset ratio is derived:




If debt and equity are treated equally on the personal level, then both have to yield the
same pretax return, namely requ = i. However, debt ﬁnancing incorporates the advantage
of interest deductibility on corporate level, inducing a preference for debt ﬁnance in the
size of: tUi
1−tU. Since the increasing indebtedness leverages the debt asset ratio, b, additional
agency cost of m + m0b occur, reducing the advantage of debt ﬁnance. The optimal debt
level is achieved, if the marginal tax preference for debt is oﬀset by the marginal increase
in the agency cost.
To evaluate the eﬀects of a marginal change in the tax rates on the ﬁnancing decision
of a ﬁrm, we analyze the change in the cost of equity stemming from a marginal change in
the tax rate under consideration. Similar to Dietz/Keuschnigg (2004) or Keuschnigg
(1991), we compute the percentage change in the cost of equity analogous to: d requ ≡ dr equ
requ ,
where dr equ denotes the deviation from the initial value of requ. The relative change in
the particular tax rate is then deﬁned as ˆ t ≡ dt





1 − tG ⇒ d requ = b tG − b ti . (16)
According to equation (16), we can see that, on the one hand, an increase in the interest
tax rate lowers the cost of equity, dr equ
dt i < 0, and stimulates therefore equity ﬁnance.
Thus, the debt asset ratio decreases.
Figure 1 here
15In Figure 1, the initial debt asset ratio denoted by b∗, is determined by the intersection
between the agency cost curve m(b)+m0(b)b a n dt h el i n es h o w i n gt h ec o s to fe q u i t y
(1−ti)i
1−tG .
Now, if the interest tax rate increases, t1
i >t i, the cost of equity ﬁnance decrease. The
reasoning is as follows: Due to an increase in the interest tax rate, a ﬁnancial market
investment yields a lower return for savers. As an implication of arbitrage, equity ﬁnance
becomes more attractive compared to external ﬁnance since investors will also require a
lower return on equity. This eﬀect lowers the debt asset ratio such that retained earnings
are increasingly used as a source of ﬁnance inducing a lower debt asset ratio of b∗2.T h e
formal derivation states: db
dt i = −
i/[(1−tG)(1−tU)]
[2m0(b)+m00(b)] < 0.
On the other hand, an increase in the capital gains tax rate increases the cost of equity,
dr equ
dt G > 0, and enhances the attractiveness of debt ﬁnance. The debt asset ratio will rise.
Starting from the equilibrium, b∗,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h ec a p i t a lg a i n st a x ,t1
g >t g, shifts the
cost of equity, leading to a higher debt asset ratio of b∗1.T h i s r e ﬂects the advantage
of debt ﬁnance under taxation. If the interest expenditures are tax deductible, then an




[2m0(b)+m00(b)] > 0 and db
dt G =+
i(1−ti)/[(1−tG)2(1−tU)]
[2m0(b)+m00(b)] > 0 apply.
3.1.4 Investment Behavior
The shadow price of capital as given in (14a) represents the value of an induced marginal
proﬁt. Adding one more unit of capital creates a marginal proﬁt stream consisting of three
diﬀerent components: ﬁrst, proﬁts increase by the marginal product of capital; second,
due to lower adjustment costs future revenues increase; and third, the interest burden on
16debt is reduced, as the debt asset ratio improves.
Combining equations (14a) and (13b) with (15) we get an expression for the cost of
capital as an average of the tax adjusted costs of equity and debt weighted by the debt
asset ratio b. For further simpliﬁcation we set β, the share of new share issues, equal to
zero, implying that equity ﬁnance solely relies on retained earnings12:
FK − δ =
∙
(1 − ti)i
(1 − tG)(1 − tU)
¸




The ﬁrst term on the right hand side indicates the cost of equity ﬁnance which are equal to
the cost of capital. The second term, the cost of debt ﬁnance consists of interest payments
plus the agency cost. The last term indicates the advantage of accelerated depreciation,
in the case e>0. If depreciation conforms to true economic depreciation, e =0holds
and the last term cancels out (as assumed in the further calculations).
By performing a comparative static analysis, basic insights about the economic eﬀects
arising from diﬀerent reform scenarios are derived. To see how changes in the tax rates
aﬀect the investment and ﬁnancial behavior of a representative ﬁrm, we compute the
eﬀect of a marginal change in one tax rate on the marginal product of capital and the
cost of equity, respectively.
Diﬀerentiating (17) with respect to the tax rate under consideration, we ﬁnd that
reducing the corporate income tax as well as the capital gains rate has a positive impact
12For the simulation we apply of course the complete formula, which includes the share of new
equity ﬁnance. This is omitted here just to make the basic insights conveyed by this formula
more clear. The comparative static results do not change as a result of this simpliﬁcation.
17on investment since in each case the cost of capital declines13:
d (FK − δ)
dt U =
(1 − ti)it




(1 − tG)2(1 − tU)
(1 − b) > 0.
The economic intuition concerning an increase in the corporate tax rate is obvious. If the
corporate tax rate increases, returns stemming from real investments are more heavily
t a x e dc o m p a r e dt oaﬁnancial investment which is not subject to the corporate tax rate.
Hence, the cost of capital increases resulting in less real investments. Concerning an
increase in the capital gains tax we know that proﬁt retentions are less favoured relative
to debt ﬁnanced investments. Thus, the cost of capital increase to the extent that proﬁt
retentions are used as a marginal source of ﬁnance. Therefore, the investment activity
will slow down.
In contrast, an increase in the interest tax rate reduces the cost of capital and stimu-
lates therefore real investments:
d (FK − δ)
dt i = −
it
(1 − tU)(1− tG)
< 0.
If the interest tax rate is raised, an alternative investment in the ﬁnancial market becomes
less attractive and thus real investments are favoured relative to ﬁnancial capital market
i n v e s t m e n t s . H e n c e ,t h et a xw e d g eb e t w e e nt h em a r g i n a lp r o d u c to fc a p i t a la n dt h e
market rate of interest becomes larger if the interest tax rate rises.
To complete the analysis concerning the long-run investment incentives induced by the
proposed reform scenarios, we also derive the King and Fullerton (1984) type formulae:
13Since we also assume that the debt asset ratio is optimally chosen, a marginal change in a
tax rate has no inﬂuence on the optimal debt asset ratio which enters the cost of capital formula.
18The marginal eﬀective tax rate is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the pre-tax return of
the corporation, denoted by u (= cost of capital as given in (17)), and the after-tax return
to the investor, denoted by s =( 1− ti)i. This marginal eﬀective tax rate measures the
overall distortion of taxation with respect to investment incentives. It is straightforward
that taxes at the corporate and personal level drive a wedge between the required pre-tax
return u and the net of tax return s to households. Using once again equation (17) we
can deﬁne the cost of capital as:
u = Marginal Rate of Return − δ,
= FK − δ + m
0b
2.
The marginal eﬀective tax rate is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the cost of capital
and the net of tax return to the private investor divided by the cost of capital, teff = u−s
u .
Under the present German tax system, the cost of capital amount to about 4.7 per cent and
the after tax return for a representative investor is approximately 3.0 per cent, implying
an eﬀective marginal tax rate of about 36.4 per cent.
Figure 2 here
Given decreasing returns to capital, the marginal rate of return curve will slope down-
ward as shown in Figure 2. In a world without taxation, the cost of capital, u,e q u a l st h e
after-tax return to private investors, s. Thus, the intersection of both curves denotes the
long-run capital stock in the absence of taxation. However, the corporate income tax at
the ﬁrm level and the dividend and capital gains taxes at the personal level increase the
19cost of capital and thus have a negative eﬀect on capital accumulation. For example, the
proposed DIT reform diminishes the tax wedge by eliminating the dividend and the cap-
ital gains tax and by reducing the proﬁt tax rate. In turn the cost of capital, u, declines
to u0 and thus the distance to the after tax return to savers, s, dwindles and stimulates
therefore the capital accumulation in the economy.
3.2 Households and General Equilibrium
Since we mainly focus on the welfare implications rather than on the distributional issues
we model the household sector using the Ramsey model of an inﬁnitely lived household.
This representative agent takes the discounted utility of all future generations into ac-
count, where the subjective discount factor is denoted by ρ<1. Accordingly, households
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subject to their budget constraint:




L · LTA + T
H
t − (1 + t
C)Ct .( 1 9 )
Utility depends on individual consumption Ct less the disutility of work, ϕ(LS
t ),w h e r e
LS
t expresses labour supply.14 Households face a trade-oﬀ between the utility stemming
from consumption and the disutility of work, implying an endogenous labour supply in the
model. Household’s budget consists of interest bearing ﬁnancial assets, (1 + rt)At,n e to f
tax labor income, (1−tL)wtLS
t +tL·LTA,w h e r eLTA stands for a labour tax allowance on
14This special form is chosen since we are only interested in the substitution eﬀect and not
t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect.
20houseold level, and governmental lump sum transfers TH
t . Wealth accumulates according
to income inﬂow, net of consumption expenditures, (1 + tC)Ct.
Solving the maximization problem of the household, optimal individual labor supply






wt .( 2 0 )
As one can easily see, an increase in the labour tax, tL,a sw e l la sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eV A T ,
tC, will lead to a decrease in labour supply:
∂ϕ0(LS
t )
∂tL < 0 and
∂ϕ0(LS
t )
∂tC < 0. According to the
reform proposal, the labour tax will be decreased, while the VAT tax is raised in order to
ﬁnance the DIT reform to assure a balanced governmental budget.















.( 2 1 )
we can analyze how a change in the VAT rate aﬀects future consumption and therefore
the savings behavior of domestic households. A rise in the VAT rate leads to a decline
in expected future income and thus current consumption is reduced and savings increase.
Moreover, the decline in the net interest rate which results from the increase in the interest
tax also encourages savings through the income eﬀe c t ,s i n c ep e o p l es a v em o r eg i v e nt h e
lower return on savings, to attain a given level of savings in the future. However, there is
only a temporary change in the net interest rate since in the long run the interest rate is
bound to fulﬁll 1+r = ρ/G due to the assumptions underlying the Ramsey model.
As a measure of welfare, we apply the equivalent variation, which speciﬁes the diﬀer-
ences in expenditures with respect to the before and after tax reform utility levels U0 and





0) .( 2 2 )
Summing up all single diﬀerences in expenditures for each period and comparing the
present value of this stream to GDP or life-time income, we can compute the change in
welfare in per cent of GDP, or life-time income, respectively.
The Rest of the World (ROW) is assumed to be a representative foreign agent who
closes the model. ROW is endowed with an exogenous income stream and chooses an
optimal consumption stream to maximize life time utility. Moreover, ROW can only save
in terms of the internationally traded bonds. However, domestic investment does not stem
solely from domestic sources but also from foreign savings, resulting in a current account







t + TB t ,( 2 3 )
where DF
t denotes foreign government debt and TB t the domestic trade balance. Since
we applied the source principle of interest taxation, a decrease in the domestic net interest
rate also aﬀects foreign savings, however, since the the net interest rate is ﬁxed due to
t h ea s s u m p t i o n su n d e r l y i n gt h eR a m s e ym o d e l ,t h e r ei sa l m o s tn oc h a n g ei nt h ea m o u n t
of foreign government bonds held by domestic individuals.
4 Policy Scenarios & Simulation Results
Starting from the prevailing German tax system in 2003, the statutory corporate tax
rate amounts to 25 per cent but adding the local trade tax and the solidarity surcharge
22the eﬀective corporate tax rate adds up to 38.6 per cent. On the household level, the
progressive labour tax rate reaches a top marginal tax rate of 48.5 per cent, including the
solidarity surcharge it amounts to 51.2 per cent. Taking an average annual income of about
20,814 per year as given, the representative agent, according to the prevailing tax bracket,
is liable to a marginal income tax of 28 per cent, which if we add the solidarity surcharge,
reaches 29.5 per cent . This tax rate also applies to interest income. According to the
German half income principle, income stemming from dividends (distributed proﬁts) is
subject to half of the personal income tax rate, while capital gains are untaxed.
In the following we consider three diﬀerent policy scenarios: Scenario 1 takes the
reform proposal made by the GCEA in their 2003 report. All tax rates applying to
any kind of capital income are set at a ﬂat rate of 30 per cent while labour income is
taxed progressively with a top marginal tax rate of 35 per cent.15 Again, we do not
use the top marginal labour tax rate but compute the marginal income tax rate of an
average individual which would amount to approximately 24 per cent. To avoid any
double taxation of distributed proﬁts the full imputation system is installed, implying a
dividend tax rate of zero. Since no capital losses should be regarded, capital gains also
need to be tax exempt, implying a capital gains tax rate of zero.
Scenario 2 takes advantage of the ‘New View’ setting. As discussed above, the divi-
dend tax is supposed to be neutral along the “New View” and therefore the dividend tax
has no impact on the investment decision of ﬁrms. Accordingly, Scenario 2 is identical to
Scenario 1, but the dividend tax is set at a ﬂat rate of 30 per cent. In this model, the
15The current local trade tax, the German ‘Gewerbesteuer’has been abolished in its existing
form as an additional charge, and is embedded in the capital and labour income tax rate,
respectively.
23dividend tax is a well-suited, non-distorting instrument to raise additional tax revenue.
Last but not least, Scenario 3 represents the “pure” dual income tax system, suggest-
ing that all kinds of capital income are taxed at a ﬂat rate. Thus, dividends will also be
subject to taxation at a ﬂat rate of 30 per cent. Since capital gains are only taxable upon
realization and not on the accrual basis we take half of the proposed statutory tax ( that
is 15 per cent) rate as a rule of thumb in the simulation exercise.
Table 1 here
The column "Status Quo" depicts the eﬀective tax rates for Germany in the year 2003,
while the other three columns show the eﬀective tax rates referring to the simulation
exercises of scenario one to three. Regarding the major loss in tax revenue — which will
arise due to the large reduction in several tax rates, there are only very few feasible ways
to ﬁnance the reform. The GCEA report proposes a comprehensive reduction of nearly all
legal tax reliefs but it is arguable whether this counteracting measure is suﬃcient. Since
the tax revenue is determined endogenously in our model, we allow for an increase in the
VAT rate to ﬁnance the proposed reform scenarios. Moreover, the increase in the VAT
rate is the preferred alternative by political analysts in ﬁnding ways to ﬁnance diﬀerent
tax reforms (Fehr and Wiegard, 2004).
4.1 Behavioral Parameters
Relying on the comparative static analysis performed in chapter 3.1.4., we anticipate
that the ﬁrst two proposed reform scenarios will have a stimulating eﬀect on capital
24accumulation and therefore on economic growth. However, this kind of examination only
gives qualitative insights of the policy proposals. To achieve quantitative results, we apply
a CGE model calibrated to a stationary equilibrium along a balanced growth path of the
German economy. The real growth rate of the German economy is approximated to be
1 per cent, which is a quite fair estimation for Germany after re-uniﬁcation. Economic
depreciation is assumed to be 10 per cent and the adjustment speed towards the new
steady state is determined by the half life of investments. Following the study of Cummins
et al. (1996) we take a value of 8.0, implying that during the following 8 years after the
policy shock half of the long run increase in the capital stock is accumulated. Accordingly,
99.9 per cent of the new steady state capital stock will be built up within 80 years.
Since the simulation results of any CGE model are strongly sensitive towards the
behavioral parameters applied, special diligence is needed when calibrating the model. All
behavioral parameters used in this model are standard results conﬁrmed by the empirical
literature. The most important ones are summarized here in Table 2:
Table 2 here
The elasticity of capital demand can be interpreted as follows: A one percent increase
in the cost of capital leads to a decline in the long-run capital stock by one percent.
Concerning the elasticity of the debt-asset ratio, a decrease in the proﬁtt a xr a t eb y
8.3 percentage points (so from the present 38.3 per cent to the suggested 30 per cent),
will lead to an increase in the debt asset ratio of 0.36∗8.6=3 .96 percentage points.
The labour supply elasticity, representing an average over empirical estimates for dif-
ferent age and sex groups, is actually a compensated supply elasticity, thus showing just
25the substitution eﬀect between labour and leisure since this is the only eﬀect we are
interested in.
4.2 Quantitative Results
The reform proposal is characterized by a large reduction of corporate and personal tax
rates. Due to the reduction in the corporate tax rate, as well as the nonexistence of
a dividend and capital gains tax, the cost of capital decreases by about nine per cent
from 4.7 to 4.3 per cent in Scenario 1, as shown in Table 3. In Scenario 2, the cost of
capital declines only by seven per cent since in this case a dividend tax is also levied.
T h i sc o n s i d e r a b l ed e c l i n ei nt h ec o s to fc a p i t a lg o e sh a n di nh a n dw i t har e d u c t i o no ft h e
marginal eﬀective tax rates thus boosting investments and enhancing economic growth.
The marginal eﬀective tax rate16 declines by 17 per cent from 36.4 to 30.2 per cent in
Scenario 1 and by 13 per cent in Scenario 2. The capital stock increases from its initial
v a l u eb ya b o u t5 . 8p e rc e n ti nS c e n a r i o1a n db y5 . 4p e rc e n ti nS c e n a r i o2l e a d i n gi n
turn to an increase in GDP by 3.3 and 3.5 per cent, respectively. Similar results are also
produced by the simulation model of Fehr and Wiegard (2004). Concerning Scenario
3, the increase in the interest tax rate decreases the cost of equity ﬁnance on the one hand.
However, on the other hand, the introduction of the capital gains tax of 15 per cent works
in the opposite direction and raises the cost of equity ﬁnance. This result derives from the
fact that we model the new view of dividend taxation and consider marginal investments
to be ﬁnanced via retained earnings. Thus, the increase in the capital gains tax leads to
16The marginal eﬀective tax rate is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the pre-tax return of the
corporation and the investor’s after tax return divided by the cost of capital.
26a rise in the cost of capital by around two per cent .
Table 3 here
We start each simulation scenario from a calibrated equilibrium, where 55 per cent of
net investments are ﬁnanced via retained earnings and 40 per cent via debt. New share
issues are ﬁxed at a rate of 5 per cent and do not vary over time. In Scenarios 1 and 2,
the eﬀect caused by the slight increase in the interest tax rate as well as by the lowering
of the corporate tax rate, leads to a rise in the relevance of retained earnings as a source
of ﬁnance. In the new long run equilibrium 58 instead of 55 per cent of net investments
are ﬁnanced via retained earnings. Concerning debt as a source of ﬁnance, only 37 per
cent of overall (net) investments are ﬁn a n c e dv i ad e b ta sc o m p a r e dt o4 0p e rc e n tb e f o r e
the reform. Summarizing, in Scenarios 1 and 2 equity is more intensively used as a source
of ﬁnance thus leading to a strengthening of the equity position of the representative ﬁrm
and lowering the indebtedness in the new steady state. The debt asset ratio decreases by
7.6 per cent in both cases. In Scenario 3 we observe a slight increase in the debt asset
ratio of 0.9 per cent. This eﬀect arises, since the introduction of the capital gains tax
increases the price of equity compared to debt as a source of ﬁnance.
Table 3 provides a rough overview of further important long-run, key economic ﬁgures
on the household side. Until now, the simulation results of Scenarios 1 and 2 did not
diﬀer noticeably, thus the results concerning the change in domestic assets may surprise
at ﬁrst glance. The explanation is intuitive: While there is no dividend tax in Scenario
1, ﬁrm values — which represent a major share (ca. 38 per cent) of the ﬁnancial wealth of
households — increase due to reform Scenario 1 by 27 per cent. In contrast, in Scenario 2,
27where a dividend tax of 30 per cent is levied, the ﬁrm value decreases by eight per cent
from its initial value. Thus, the change in ﬁrm values inﬂuences the change in the asset
position signiﬁcantly.
On the household level the reform is characterized by a major reduction in the personal
income tax rates. For an average individual the marginal labour income tax rate drops
from 29.4 to 24 per cent. This tax relief has a major impact on the labour-leisure decision
and households are willing to supply a larger amount of labour to the ﬁrm sector. The
increased investment and capital accumulation lead also to a rise in wages of 1.4 and 1.1
per cent in Scenario 1 and 2 respectively. This result derives from the fact that capital and
labour are complementary production factors and accordingly an increased capital stock
increases the demand for labour. In turn, households increase their labour supply by 2.2
and 2.6 per cent in Scenarios 1 and 2. The larger increase in labour supply in the second
case must be astonishing at ﬁrst glance. Even though gross wages increase more in the
ﬁrst Scenario, it is current real wages, which also depend on consumption taxes, that aﬀect
the supply of labour by households. Since the VAT rate increases by only two percentage
points in the second Scenario (compared to 3.7 percentage points in Scenario1), it is clear
that labour supply will be higher as a result of this second alternative reform proposal.
However, this is not the only eﬀect that determines labour supply. Due to the aug-
mented capital accumulation, the marginal product of labor — the complementary produc-
tion factor — rises, also implying an increase in labour supply . Thus, disposable income
of households increases by seven per cent in Scenario 1 and by 7.6 per cent in Scenario 2
leading to a rise in consumption of 2.8 and 3.3 per cent, respectively.
28Since the reform scenarios have to be ﬁnanced somehow, we allow for the VAT to
adapt in order to balance the governmental budget without cutting lump-sum transfers
to households. Simulating Scenario 1, the VAT increases from initially 16 per cent by 3.7
percentage points to 19.7 per cent assuring that the reform is revenue neutral. Since the
government can draw on an additional tax revenue from the dividend taxation in Scenario
2, the required increase in the VAT rate amounts to only 2 percentage points, thus nearly
2 percentage points less than in Scenario 1. In Scenario 3, the VAT rate also rises to a
level of about 18 per cent. The increase in revenue from capital gains taxation is not large
enough to balance the governmental budget such that the VAT has to adjust accordingly
to make the reform revenue neutral.
To be able to evaluate the welfare implications17 of the three reform scenarios we
rely on the equivalent variation to measure welfare. Therefore, we compute pre and post
reform utility levels of a representative individual and calculate how much money the
agent would need before the reform to reach the same utility level that is achieved after
t h er e f o r m . T h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h i sc a s hﬂow is then expressed in terms of total life-
time income of the representative agent and GDP. Scenario 2 yields not only the largest
increase in GDP but also the largest increase in welfare. While welfare in terms of life-
time income increases by 1.7 per cent — which is equivalent to a 0.9 per cent increase in
terms of GDP — in Scenario 2, in Scenario 1, welfare only amounts to 0.8 per cent of GDP
. The lowest increase in welfare in Scenario 3 is basically the result of the high capital
gains taxation, which leads to a weaker increase in disposable income and consumption.
17Welfare is measured without public services.
294.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The large number of empirical papers that estimate diﬀerent values for important be-
havioral parameters used in the model suggests to check the robustness of our results if
diﬀerent values for the key behavioral parameters are assumed. There are basically four
diﬀerent elasticities which are of interest in our context: The labour supply elasticity ε,
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σC, the elasticity of factor substitution σK ,
and the elasticity concerning the debt asset ratio σB .
Table 4 here
Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the results of the simulation exercise of Scenarios 1, 2 and
3, respectively, with diﬀerent values for the underlying elasticities. The basic scenario
applies a labour supply elasticity of ε =0 .37 which is a weighted average of compensated
wage elasticities of labour supply for Germany estimated by Fenge et al. (2002).18
If we set this elasticity close to zero, i.e. to ε =0 .01, we model an almost ﬁxed labour
supply. 19 Simulating scenario 1 (2, 3), the labour supply increases by only 0.05 per
cent (0.06 per cent, 0.05 per cent) and thus also capital accumulation is impeded. In the
long run the capital stock increases by only 3.58 per cent (2.81 per cent) instead of the
5.76 per cent (5.43 per cent) calculated in the base Scenario 1 (2). Accordingly, private
consumption increases only to a smaller extent of 0.28 (0.27) per cent.
18The authors compute four diﬀerent elasticities for men and women aged 20-39 and 40-39,
using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel We then compute a weighted average of
0.37, using these elasticities and the share of employed in each of these categories.
19Such an assumption is plausible for Germany, as shown by the last tax reform : Although the
German Tax Reform 2000 lead to a signiﬁcant decrease in personal income tax rates employment
did not increase, but decreased due to labor market rigidities and various other structural
problems (Sinn 2004).
30Table 5 here
Next, the values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σC,r e ﬂect the change
in the pattern of consumption and saving over time. We start with a value of 0.4 in the
base scenario and then run the simulation with a higher value of 0.6. The model is to
a large degree robust to the change in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The
results change only slightly as depicted in the fourth column of tables 4 through 6. The
reason why the results do change only so little is due to the fact that the long-run interest
rate is bound to equal the rate of time preference in the long-run in the Ramsey model
and the diﬀerence in tax rates on interest income before and after the reform is negligible.
20
Table 6 here
Another important parameter is the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour. This elasticity is like a capital demand elasticity in our model. The more elastic
capital demand is, the higher is the reaction to a change in the tax rates. Accordingly,
even a slight lowering of the pre-tax rate of return will stimulate capital creation. A
higher elasticity means that in Figure 2 the MRR curve becomes ﬂatter such that at a
given pre-tax rate of return s the same decrease in the required pre-tax rate of return
20Still, the following eﬀects can arise as a result of a change in the taxation of interest income.
According to theory, a higher intertemporal elasticity will have a stronger eﬀect on the savings
behavior of households. If the net interest rate decreases, savings will increase, since the income
eﬀect will dominate the substitution eﬀect. The substitution eﬀect arises since a lower interest
rate increases the price of future periods consumption and thus we have a substitution of present
consumption for future consumption. However, a lower interest rate leads to a positive income
eﬀect since the amount of savings needed to attain a given consumption level tomorrow, is
increased.
31u is followed by a higher adjustment of the capital stock. The basic scenario employs
a factor substitution elasticity of the CES production function of 0.8. There are several
estimates for this measure in the empirical literature, thus we simulate the proposed
scenarios with a higher elasticity of 1.3. The higher elasticity leads to an even larger
increase in the change of the long run capital stock compared to the base case. The long
run capital stock increases by 8.15 (7.31) per cent in Scenario 1 (2) and only by 0.9 per
cent in Scenario 3. Accordingly, the increased capital intensity leads to a change in labour
supply, which increases by 2.21 per cent and 2.66 per cent in Scenarios 1 and 2. In turn,
the consumption level of households rises by about three and 3.5 per cent, respectively.
Regarding the debt elasticity, this measure shows how elastic the ﬁrm’s debt ratio
reacts to diﬀerent tax reform scenarios. In the baseline model the elasticity concerning
the debt asset ratio is set to 0.36, while column six and seven of Tables 4 through 6
show the simulation results using a debt asset elasticity of 0.16 and 0.56, respectively.
Firms choose the optimal debt level such that the costs of internal ﬁnancing and external
ﬁnancing are equalized. If internal ﬁnancing becomes cheaper, i.e. the required rate of
return declines, enterprises will start ﬁnancing more of their investments via retained
earnings until the costs of external ﬁnancing also decline due to the shrinking debt ratio.
A reduced elasticity of e.g. 0.16 leads to a less elastic reaction of ﬁrms to cheaper internal
ﬁnancing.
325C o n c l u s i o n
Following the ongoing discussion of reforming the German tax system, the paper takes
up the reform proposal made by the German Council of Economic Advisors in
2003. This reform proposal suggests a dual income tax for Germany similar to the one
already practiced in the Nordic Countries. To analyze the economic eﬀects of such a
dual tax system, we apply a dynamic computable general equilibrium model and simulate
three diﬀerent reform scenarios. With standard assumptions on behavioral parameters
and marginal tax rates, the reform leads to an increase in investments and therefore in
capital accumulation of about 5.8 per cent. Comparing steady state values, GDP rises by
3.3 per cent and household consumption by 2.8 per cent. This complete restructuring of
the tax system leads in the long run to a welfare gain of approximately 0.8 per cent of
GDP which is mainly based on the increase in life-time wealth as a result of the lower tax
burden. These results are to a large extent robust concerning the choice of the behavioral
elasticities. The only important exemption is the labor supply elasticity. If we assume
a labor supply elasticity close to zero, which is quite plausible for Germany due to the
current frictions on the German labor market, the growth impact of this comprehensive
tax reform diminishes. For example, the capital stock increases by only 3.9 per cent
instead of the initial 5.8 per cent and GDP rises by only 1.2 per cent instead of the former
3.3 per cent. Thus, the labour supply is an important determinant of growth in two
respects: First, if a tax reform stimulates capital accumulation a lack of labour supply
will impede the accumulation of the complementary production factor capital. Second, if
labour supply does not respond to tax incentives, households can not earn any additional
33income and thus there is no demand side driven growth.
Thus, the change from the prevailing comprehensive income tax system to a dual
income tax system will have a signiﬁcant impact on capital accumulation and growth as



























Marginal product of capital
Figure 2: The Marginal Eﬀective Tax Rate
36Table 1: Tax Rates Before and After the Reform
Status Quo (2003) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
ProﬁtT a x ,tU 0.386 0.30 0.30 0.30
Labour Tax, tL 0.295 0.24 0.24 0.24
Tax on Interest Income, ti 0.295 0.30 0.30 0.30
Dividend Tax, tD 0.148 0.00 0.30 0.30
Capital Gains Tax, tG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15
VAT, tC 0.16 endogenous endogenous endogenous
Source: Ministry of Finance, (BMF, 2004), (GCEA, 2003)
37Table 2: Behavioral Parameter Values
Elasticity of Capital Demand∗) (CHIRINKO 2002) - 1.0
Half Life of Capital Accumulation (in years) (CUMMINS et al. 1996) 8.0
Elasticity of Debt-Asset Ratioˆ) (GRAHAM et al. 1998) 0.36
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (FLAIG 1988) 0.4
Elasticity of Factor Substitution (GERMAN BUNDESBANK 1995) 0.8
Labour supply elasticity (weighted average of FENGE et al. 2002) 0.37
Elasticity with respect to: ∗) cost of capital; ˆ) proﬁtt a x
38Table 3: Key Economic Figures (Long Run Change in %)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Capital stock 5.8 5.4 1.4
Cost of Capital - 8.9 - 6.9 1.9
Marginal Eﬀective Tax Rate - 17.1 - 13.0 3.2
Gross Domestic Product 3.3 3.5 1.9
Equity as Source of Finance 5.5 5.5 - 0.6
Debt Asset Ratio - 7.6 - 7.6 0.9
Domestic Assets 4.8 - 8.5 -1.8
Gross Wage 1.4 1.1 -0.3
Labour Supply 2.2 2.6 2.1
Disposable Income 7 7.6 5.6
Domestic Consumption 2.8 3.3 2.5
VAT Rate (Change in %-points) 3.7 2 1.9
Welfare in % of Life Time Income 1.4 1.7 1.2
Welfare in % of GDP 0.8 0.9 0.6
Source: own calculations
39Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis (Long Run Changes in %)
Scenario 1 ∗) ε =0 .01 σC =0 .6 σK =1 .3 σB =0 .16 σB =0 .56
Change in capital stock 5.75 3.58 5.76 8.15 5.70 5.80
Change in stock of debt -2 . 3 4 - 4.31 - 2.29 - 0.08 2.11 - 6.70
Change in labour supply 2.15 0.05 2.15 2.21 2.14 2.16
Change in onsumption 2.80 0.28 2.80 2.95 2.75 2.83
∗)applied parameters: ε =0 .37; σC=0 .4; σK =0 .8; σB =0 .36;
Source: own calculations.
40Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis (Long Run Changes in %)
Scenario 2 ∗) ε =0 .01 σC =0 .6 σK =1 .3 σB =0 .16 σB =0 .56
Change in capital stock 5.43 2.81 5.43 7.31 5.35 5.51
Change in stock of debt -2 . 5 9 - 5.02 - 2.59 - 0.86 1.79 - 6.99
Change in labour supply 2.61 0.06 2.61 2.66 2.58 2.64
Change in onsumption 3.31 0.27 3.34 3.46 3.25 3.38
∗)applied parameters: ε =0 .37; σC=0 .4; σK =0 .8; σB =0 .36;
Source: own calculations.
41Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis (Long Run Changes in %)
Scenario 3 ∗) ε =0 .01 σC =0 .6 σK =1 .3 σB =0 .16 σB =0 .56
Change in capital stock 1.36 - 0.67 1.36 0.90 1.37 1.36
Change in stock of debt 2.23 0.18 2.23 1.76 1.75 2.71
Change in labour supply 2.09 0.05 2.09 2.08 2.09 2.09
Change in onsumption 2.48 0.00 2.48 2.44 2.49 2.47
∗)applied parameters: ε =0 .37; σC=0 .4; σK =0 .8; σB =0 .36; σB =0 .36
Source: own calculations.
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